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This paper describes and evaluates the impact of the transition process in the agricultural 
sector in the Czech Republic; its objective is to analyse and clarify the outcome of 
transition, and the prospects of the sector.  
 
The paper starts with examination of agriculture under the communist regime, continues 
with the transformation process, in particular changes in total economic output, 
employment, production and other structural attributes. The qualitative assessment 
examines the transformation of state and collective farms into other corporate structures, 
where assets are not based on collective ownership. The paper further questions the reasons 
for a lack of profit and credit sources. The analysis is concluded with suggestions for 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The well-known “Velvet Revolution” of 17 November 1989 started macroeconomic 
reform, and the process of transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy 
began. Compared to other Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), the 
Czechoslovak economy in 1989 had some attributes favouring a successful transition, such 
as a low level of domestic and foreign debt, a fair degree of macroeconomic stability, a 
highly skilled labour force and a low rate of price inflation.
2 Nevertheless, new authorities 
had to cope with a difficult legacy. Having been among the most developed of European 
economies between the World Wars, communist rule saw Czechoslovakia slip backwards 
for 40 years and GDP per capita dropped well below the average of neighbouring EU 
countries, although remaining higher than in many other CEEC. The reform programme 
undertaken by the new governments, consisted essentially of price liberalisation, currency 
reform, privatisation and transformation. The goal was to achieve a market economy and to 
prepare the country for EU accession. 
 
Similar goals were also set up in the agricultural sector. The issue of transformation, the 
setting of new agricultural policies and their shortcomings is the central focus of this paper. 
The objective is to identify the unique path, given by a favourable starting point for 
transformation and a relatively low share of agriculture in total economy that the Czech 
agricultural sector is following. As the president of the Czech Republic, Mr. Vaclav Havel 
points out: “There is no identity without continuity” (November; 2001). Therefore we will 
look at the development of the Czech agricultural policies and their practical effects. 
 
The structure of this paper is therefore as follows. The first section examines the state of 
agriculture under the communist regime. The following section looks at the principles of 
transition in collective and state farms, as well as in the up-&-downstream sector. Further, 
the paper clarifies and analyses the outcome of transition. The paper also describes the 
principles of new agricultural policy and is then summarised by recommendations and 
conclusions. 
 
2.  Agriculture under the communist regime 
 
Forty years of “agricultural policy” that was based on collective and state ownership, led to 
the creation of large agricultural enterprises, such as collective and state farms, which 
accounted for almost all farm output. Smallholders were transformed into wage earners. 
This loss of private ownership in most cases resulted in a loss of incentive, initiative and 
accountability.  
 
During the communist time, collective farms played the dominant role in Czech agriculture. 
Collective farms (co-operatives) operated on 62% of the total agricultural land and 
accounted for almost 70% of agricultural production. Second  in importance were state 
farms, which occupied 25% of the total agricultural land, and the other state-owned 
enterprises in agriculture, such as seed-producing farms, school farms and military farms, 
which occupied 12% of the total agricultural land. The 3,205 individual private farmers had 
less than 1 % of the total agricultural land (OECD; 1995). 
 
                                                 
2 As Slovakia demanded its independence, on January 1993 Czechoslovakia was divided into two countries, 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.   3 
Table 1:   Agricultural structure in the communist time 














Collective farms  1,024  2,561  62  70  75 
State farms  174  9,200  37  29  24.7 
Individual farmers  3,205  12  1  1  0.3 
Source: OECD (1995), FSU (1985), Doucha (2001) 
 
In the pre-reform period, there were 1,024 collective farms, with an averaged size of 2,561 
ha. The collective farm sector employed in total 403,000 workers, which represents 75% of 
employment in agriculture (OECD; 1995).   
 
The emergence of collective farms was an outcome of the February 1948 Communist coup 
and consequent process of forced collectivisation (subject to Law no. 69 from 1949) 
(Kubacak; 1992). During this process of collectivisation, farmers were expropriated and 
forced to join large-scale collective farms. The assets of collective farms were thus 
composed of  the collection of properties initially belonging to the private farmers. 
Throughout the communist period, all land on collective farms remained the legal property 
of individuals, but the members of the collective, in fact the legitimate owners, were never 
free to exploit their land. The only exception was the use of small plots/gardens. The 
existence of enormous fields within the collective, on the one hand, and the private small 
plots on the other hand, reflected a dual production structure. 
 
Generally speaking, collective farms were located in more favoured areas than state farms 
and private farms. Collective farms were more efficient than state farms, even though in 
comparison to the state farms they received lower subsidies. Nevertheless, even with the 
presence of subsidies, production was not always profitable and therefore collective farms 
increasingly engaged in various activities, often in the upstream-&-downstream sectors, but 
in many cases totally outside the agro-food sector. These non-agricultural activities were 
substantially more developed in the collective farm sector, than in the state farm sector. The 
initiative of non-agricultural activities was to some extent based on enterpreneurially driven 
behaviour, as such activities were not subject to central planning, and income generated this 
way could be kept within the collective farm. It is important to note, that in 1989 non-
agricultural activities represented about 20 % of market production, but accounted for 
almost 50% of the profits of collective farms (OECD; 1995). 
 
In contrast to the collective farms, state farms were basically branches of one state-owned 
company. The state farm sector operated on confiscated, non-inhibitated land of usually 
border and mountainous regions, and later on land that originally belonged to continuously 
non-prosperous collective farms (Kubacak; 1994). In particular, such land was acquired by 
the state during two “Land Reforms”. During the “New Land Reform”, which took place 
after February 1948, land was expropriated from farms sized 150 – 250 ha. Such farms 
usually belonged to aristocratic families and the church.
3 “The Post-War Land Reform” 
confiscated land that during the Second World War belonged to Germans and traitors 
(Kubacak; 1992). The state farm sector consisted of 174 state farms averaging more than 
                                                 
3 Aristocratic families and the church used to own farms larger than 250 ha, but they were subject to a land 
reform through the “Annexation Law” of 1919. Nevertheless during this time, this land did not become “state 
land”.   4 
6,000 hectares, however some of these farms exceeded 10,000 hectares of agricultural land. 
The state farm sector employed 128,000 agricultural workers in total, and accounted for 
24% of employment in agriculture (OECD; 1995). State farm sector was the least efficient 
component of agriculture, because state farms were usually located in less favourable 
natural conditions, and also because the degree of motivation and the quality of 
management was substantially lower than on collective farms. 
 
The importance of private farms in the pre-reform period was negligible in respect to total 
agricultural production. There were a total of 3,205 private farms accounting for less than 1 
% of agricultural land, usually located i n mountainous areas. Private farmers were also 
eligible for state subsidies. About 2,000 people were employed in private farms over 10 
hectares (OECD; 1995). 
 
The main “agricultural policy” objectives in the pre-reform period included: self-
sufficiency in  temperate zone agricultural products, low and stable food prices for 
consumers, and an equitable income distribution within agriculture. Self-sufficiency was to 
be achieved through central planning of resource allocation and agricultural production, 
assisted by a policy of political and social preference accorded to agriculture that 
redistributed resources in favour of primary agriculture. Price and income support policies 
operated in such a way as to enable all agricultural enterprises to pay their labour force the 
guaranteed basic wage, irrespective of economic performance. 
 
The important policy instrument comprised a pricing system under which a uniform 
standard quality price for most agricultural products was fixed for the whole country. The 
basic price was adjusted by bonuses and penalties depending on the quality of the product 
relative to the standard quality. In addition, supplementary direct payments were available 
to all agricultural producers for several basic products to stimulate their production (OECD; 
1995). Consumer subsidies for food (via a negative turnover tax) were paid to maintain 
stable relatively below cost prices in primary agriculture and the food marketing chain. 
 
The price system was complemented by an income support system for farming in less 
favoured natural conditions, and a system of land taxation of producers farming in more 
favourable conditions. Support payments were differentiated according to the natural 
conditions of production and were partly funded by the land tax. The system stimulated 
output under poor conditions irrespective of the cost of production. The shock of the 
removal of these payments was therefore greatest for the least efficient farms. Further 
income support came from tax relief in the form of a deductible minimum amount per 
hectare applied to all farms.  
 
Agricultural trade in the pre-1989 era was conducted according to the precepts of a state 
planned economy, with state-directed export and import policy clearly defining two 
different trading zones. The first trading zone was the so-called “rouble zone” for trade 
conducted with members of COMECON.
4 The second trading zone was the so-called 
                                                 
4 COMECON (also known as CMEA) was founded by a communiqué agreed upon by the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Albania. East Germany joined in 1950, Albania 
was expelled in 1961, Mongolia joined in 1962 and Cuba in 1972. Yugoslavia had associate status. Finland, 
Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Mozambique had a non-socialist co-operant status with CMEA, since 
governments of these countries w ere not empowered to conclude agreements in the name of private 
companies, and therefore these governments did not take direct part in CMEA operations (Glenn; 1992). 
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“dollar zone” for trade conducted with the rest of the world. The total agro-food trade 
balance was and still is characteristically negative as the Czech Republic is traditionally a 
net agro-food importer.  
 
3.  Agriculture in transition 
 
The agricultural reform that began in 1989 was an integral part of the transition to a market 
economy. This reform was based on a respect for private ownership and on a belief that 
economic prosperity would be enhanced by the existence of private enterprises. The 
appropriate basic legal framework for implementing the structural reform of the agro-food 
sector was laid down by the laws enacted in 1991 and 1992. These laws dealt with property 
restitution, privatisation of state enterprises, transformation of collective farms and the 
“Land Act”, and thus acted as the essential components of the transition process. 
 
Property restitution in essence involved the return of property expropriated by the state to 
its rightful owners. The adopted principle of the process was full restitution of all property, 
which was expropriated after February 1948 by the Communist government. Claims for 
property restitution had to be submitted and justified before the end of 1992. Those who 
were entitled to restitution according to the law were Czechoslovak citizens or their heirs 
resident in Czechoslovakia. As the deadline was extended to 31 August 1993, after the 
separation from Slovakia on 1 January 1993, only Czech citizens could submit claims for 
restitution in the Czech Republic, as the Slovak citizens were entitled to follow a similar 
procedure in Slovakia. Hayashi (2001) argues that “the setting of a limited period of time 
was intended to exclude Sudeten Germans, who were expelled from Czechoslovakia during 
1945-1947”. Nevertheless, Doucha (2001) notes that both of these conditions have been 
amended many times in order to satisfy the interests of specific groups of citizens, e.g. 
emigrants from the communist period. Thus in effect, the restitution enabled the Czech 
Republic to go back to prior-1948.  
 
The restitution, in principle, required that when it was possible, the original property had to 
be physically restored. Alternatively, property of an equivalent value could be offered. 
When the original property no longer existed, the claimant could insist on compensation in 
cash up to a maximum of CZK 10,000 (about  € 285). This compensation was to be 
achieved with the remaining shares of the Restitution Investment Fund; a fund that 
registered all the properties that had to be restituted. In the case of land claims, land of 
equivalent value was an alternative when it was not possible to restore the original land, for 
example when it had since been built on.  
 
3.a.  Transformation of collective farms (“co-operatives”) 
 
As mentioned in section 2, after the Second World War, the Stalinist model of agricultural 
collectivisation was imposed on CEEC. The exception was Poland and Slovenia, where 
land remained in private property and use during the whole communist period. This forced 
membership of co-operatives (collective farms) in the rest of the CEEC included the 
nationalisation of non-land assets and title to land. Expropriated land was gathered together 
and large collective farms were created.
5 Additionally, also a small part of state land was 
                                                 
5 The Czech name for these farms is “druzstvo”, meaning “co-operative”, although 
membership was not voluntary. Therefore the name “collective farm” more accurately 
expresses their substance.    6 
farmed by collective farms and therefore was dealt with as part of the privatisation of state 
property.  
 
Given the economic importance of collective farms, their transformation was a key part of 
agricultural reform. The process consisted of two main steps: the settlement of property 
rights and the property transformation into alternative corporate structures not based on 
collective property. Property rights settlement itself had two main components; one 
involving private property (mainly land) and the other part involving the distribution of 
collectively owned property. As land was never collectively owned, the latter process was 
not relevant.  
 
The transformation process was based on “Transformation Act” 42/1992 Sb., and 
essentially meant converting collective farms into other corporate or legal structures that 
are not based on collective property. According to this law, the property shares of people 
who owned land and/or other agricultural property that was brought in the collective farm 
and/or who worked in the collective farm were calculated (Kraus et al.; 1994). These 
property shares were calculated on the bases of collective farm property after deduction of 
restitution claims. Essentially this property, after auditing valuation, was converted into 
shares. Gruza (1999) states that according to the Transformation Act, there were about 
800,000 eligible shareholders. Out of these 800,000, about 50,000 (6%) requested their 
property to be physically returned to them and many of them started private farms. 450,000 
(56%) of these eligible shareholders left their property shares in co-operatives, and thus 
they have a share on the economic output of the co-operative and interest in the profit-
making of their co-operative. 300,000 (38%) of the eligible property shareholders did not 
withdraw their property in kind, nor did they “invest it” in the co-operative, but asked for 
compensation. The Transformation Act states that co-operatives must compensate those 
eligible property shareholders within seven years, which means by 1999. A number of co-
operative farms compensated their eligible shareholders, usually in kind. However, there 
are still 80 co-operative farms, which have not repaid their debts, nor did they transform 
into other corporate structure (Gruza; 1999).  
 
Property shares were used as (i) starting capital for new family farms, established on the 
basis of restitution; (ii) a membership investment brought into transformed enterprises; and 
(iii) “dead capital” for non-members of transformed enterprises, which had to be repaid 
within seven years. The next step in the process was the transformation of the collective 
farm into an alternative corporate structure such as a new co-operative or a joint stock 
company. By 28 January 1992 all those involved had to decide how to engage their new or 
reconfirmed property, including land, in an agricultural activity (OECD; 1995).  
 
Only on the basis of approval by entitled persons could be established a new (transformed) 
co-operative or other kind of company. The new co-operative is acknowledged as a 
transformed one after being listed in the register of enterprises; in the opposite case, the 
collective farm is liquidated.
6  
 
The confirmation of land property was a relatively straightforward process and only 
became complicated when the owner wished to remove that land from the new corporate 
structure. In addition to land, in the process of nationalisation additional property was put 
                                                 
6 The new type “co-operative” is essentially a production co-operative, and unlike the typical Danish co-
operative which is usually involved in the marketing of agricultural produce, this new Czech co-operative 
concentrates on the primary production of agricultural produce.    7 
into collectives, usually livestock and machinery. Private property rights remained valid 
throughout the collective period on such a property or its equivalent. Although somewhat 
more difficult to deal with than land, property rights issues only became a significant 
problem when the owner wished to remove the property.  
 
Although theoretical solutions as well as legal regulations for property withdrawal were in 
place, its practical implementation encountered difficulties. These practical and logistical 
difficulties were inherited in the physical nature of the assets. In case of land restitutions, 
the identification of land boundaries on the large piece of land that used to belong to co-
operative farms posed a challenge. Another logistical obstacle was making sure that the 
restituted parcel would be accessible to the owner, as the system of auxiliary field-roads has 
changed during the fifty years of communism. In case of non-land assets in kind, the fair 
assignment of property such as livestock, machinery and buildings was an obviously 
contentious issue. Where share property was involved, the new owner could opt to sell his 
shares to the transformed collective or to remove his property share in kind. This issue of 
claims’ restitutions, pertaining to the transfer of land and other property in kind, was the 
competence of the Central Land Office and its local branches. 
 
The transformation of collective farms was finished according to the law in January 1993 
with the following results: the transformation process entered 1,197 collective farms, which 
were transformed into 1,233 new co-operatives, 39 shareholder companies and 59 other 
companies; 24 former collective farms entered liquidation (Kraus et. al; 1994). Evidence 
shows that the majority of members of the original collective farms decided to adopt the 
new co-operative form and only few former members started their own family farms. As 
the co-operatives were splitting into smaller, more manageable units, their average size fell 
by nearly half, from around 2,578 hectares to about 1,447 hectares (Lerman; 1999).  
 
Figure 1:   Transformation of collective farms 




Many of the new co-operatives were starting with a weak capital position, and as a result of 
large debts required additional access to financial resources. There were two main reasons 
for this “financial thirst”. The old, large-scale equipment used by collective farms was 
inappropriate for smaller-scale individual farming. The need for family-farm equipment 
required substantial resources to be invested into structural adjustment. The management of 
1,197 collective farms    1,233 co-operative farms (Average size 1,447 ha) 
(Average size 2,578 ha) 
            39 shareholder companies 
 
            59 other types of companies 
           
            24 liquidated  
   
800,000 eligible shareholders    50,000 private farms (6.25 %) 
 
           450,000 left in co-operatives (re-invested) (56.25 %) 
           
           300,000 asked for compensation (37.50%)   8 
new co-operatives has somewhat improved and productivity has increased with the 
decrease in employment. Other corporate structures, such as limited liability companies and 
joint stock companies, were rarely adopted in the process of transforming of collective 
farms.  
 
3.b.  State farm privatisation 
 
Privatisation is a transfer of ownership of state property to private hands and is distinct 
from the process of restitution by which state property also changes hands but reverts to 
those with a historical claim to ownership.  
 
The privatisation of state farms, especially state land, was complicated by the need to retain 
land and other assets pending a full resolution of such claims. These delays in the 
restitution process contributed to delays in the privatisation of state farms. These delays led 
to the exclusion of almost all state farms from the second wave of voucher privatisation in 
1994 and alternative legal methods of privatisation had to be adopted. Another 
complicating factor was that farms were left with large accumulating debts, because all 
restitution had to be made free of debt. 
 
Therefore, privatisation of state farms started with all assets except land, against which 
there were no restitution claims. For privatisation purposes, these “residual” assets were 
valued net of debts. While the restitution process was largely incomplete the unrestituted 
agricultural land of state farms remained the property of the Land Fund. The land, currently 
belonging to the state, usually located in border regions, will be sold, with the exception of 
some research farms. 
 
In 1999 the Senate of the Czech Republic approved an Amendment to the Law on sales of 
state land, which enables privatisation of more than half a million hectares of state land, 
from about 900,000 hectares that are now administered by the Land Fund (Hospodarske 
Noviny; 1999). The Land Fund of the Czech Republic recently implemented the above-
specified amendment to the Land Law, by a decision to sell 10,284 land parcels with the 
total size of 11,703 ha (Czech Press Agency; 2001).
7  
 
3.c.  Privatisation of upstream and downstream industries 
 
The upstream and downstream industries under the communist regime were predominantly 
state-owned enterprises. Before 1990 major agricultural commodities were procured from 
agricultural enterprises at fixed prices, while inputs for farms were supplied by specifically 
appointed, essentially monopolistic procurement organisations. An important objective of 
the privatisation process was to break the monopoly powers of these enterprises. 
 
Unlike state farms that were privatised mostly by direct sale, input supply industries and 
food processing and distribution industries were mostly privatised under the voucher 
privatisation scheme. Voucher privatisation was operated in two waves, one in 1992 and 
1994. Czech citizens were offered a voucher worth 1,000 bidding points for nominal fee. 
The vouchers could be used to bid for the shares of companies listed for privatisation. 
Individuals could invest their points in investment funds, which could also bid for shares. 
                                                 
7 The objective of the Land fund of the Czech Republic (Pozemkovy Fond Ceske Republiky) is to administer 
state estates, according to the law no. 229/1991 Sb.   9 
Each wave consisted of a number of rounds in which prices were adjusted administratively 
according to supply and demand. Many of these formally privatised companies have been 
able to maintain their dominant market positions. They have a number of competitive 
advantages over newcomers, such as specialised knowledge and experience of key 
production and marketing techniques. Consequently, there has been some tendency for state 
monopolies to be replaced by private or semi-public monopolies. 
 
By year 1995 there were practically no non-privatised enterprises in the food industry. 
However, the state retains a small share of some privatised industries (OECD; 1995). 
Foreign direct investment was important in food industry privatisation. 
 
3.d.  Transformation effects 
 
The outcome of agricultural transition was a dramatic contraction of agriculture. Although 
the share of agriculture in total economic activity in the Czech Republic was never as high 
as in other CEEC, it shrunk by 60% from 4.5% to 1.8% (OECD; 1995 & Ministry of 
Agriculture of the Czech Republic; 2000). The absolute size of agricultural production has 
contracted as well; livestock production more than crop production (Czech Statistical 
Office; 2000). A decade of transformation resulted in a 90% increased labour productivity. 
The consumption of foodstuff has also decreased, in absolute as well as relative terms; 
OECD (1995) estimated a 7% consumption fall and its relative proportion on total spending 
dropped from 26.9% (1989) to 23.9% (1997) (Kucera; 2001). This is a simple outcome of 
Engel’s Law. Over the transition period, the share of agriculture in national employment 
fell from 9.8% to 4.2% (Davis & Pearce; 2000).  
 
Figure 2: The transformation outcomes of the agricultural sector 
The declining importance of agriculture in economy of the 












































Based on: Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic; 1996, 1997, 2000, World Bank; 1999, 
Davis & Pearce; 2000, Government office of the Czech Republic; 2001 
 
Private (individual) farming is a new phenomenon in Czech agriculture. Although private 
farming has strong roots prior to 1945, the communist regime virtually eliminated their 
existence. The last decade saw an upswing of private farming, with an average size of 34 ha 
(European Commission; 1998 & Lerman; 1999). 
 
The number of private farms increased considerably, from 3,205 in 1989 to 32,365 in 1998. 
Private farms now operate on about 24% of agricultural land, contrary to EU countries, but   10 
still do not play a dominant role in the Czech agricultural sector. New transformed co-
operatives operate on about 35% of agriculture land (Kucera; 2001). And the remaining 
41% of agricultural land is farmed by various agricultural holdings that operate as legal 
entities.  
 
Table 3:   Farm structure development 1989-1999 (% of agricultural land) 
  1989  1995  1996  1997  1998  1998 
Co-operative farms  65.6  47.0  43.2  38.7  34.5  32.2 
Companies (Joint-stock & Limited 
Liabilities) 
-  28.0  31.9  35.4  40.6  43.3 
Private farms  0.3  23.3  23.8  25.1  23.7  23.5 
State farms  34.1  1.7  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.0 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Doucha et. al. (2001) 
 
The employment preference at co-operative farms is rooted in the fact that most members 
of collective farms lacked experience with any other type of farming. Additionally, the 
previous level of security offered by the former collectives, in terms of employment and the 
provision of social services made a continuation of a co-operative form attractive, at least 
from the short/medium term perspective. After all, leaving this relative employment 
security would require a “risk-taking” attitude, which is an uneasy concept for most people 
brought up in a “risk-averse” environment. 
 
Despite the successful transition of the Czech agricultural sector, about 3% of restitution 
claims have not been settled, being subject to court or administrative proceedings (Doucha 
et. al.; 2001). What remains to be solved is the privatisation of state land mentioned above; 
here the decision was taken and this land will be sold in the near future. Furthermore, 
although not big in size, the sensitive issue of restoring land to the church and Jewish 
people remains (Doucha et. al.; 2001). 
 
Table 2:   Czech farms and their size structure (1999) 
  Number of farms  Agricultural land (ha) 
Up to 10 ha  12,220  60,972 
11-50 ha  8,130  179,740 
51-100 ha  1,253  87,403 
101-500 ha  1,625  382,305 
501-1000 ha  748  556,722 
1001-2000 ha  770  1,090,864 
Above 2000 ha  396  1,145,173 
Source: Based on Doucha et.al. (2001) 
Note: Does not include small household plots 
 
 
3.e.  Support and policy 
 
The 90% increase of labour productivity during the transition process illustrates the 
enormous structural changes that the Czech agricultural sector underwent in the past 
decade. Nevertheless, the generally negative economic outcome of the agricultural sector 
also indicates that the restructuralisation has not yet reached a stage where the economic 
output is viable.    11 
 
In this context, it is important to mention that it is unlikely that during the pre-1989 era, co-
operative and state farms generated profits, in purely economic terms, as the generous level 
of subsidies received from the communist governments masked the sector’s ineffectiveness. 
However, exact data quantifying the economic outcome of the sector from the “market 
economy” perspective are not available. Available data show that support in the pre-reform 
period was high; the PSE was 59% (OECD; 2001).
8 The main part of PSE, about 78%, was 
used for market price support; the second important item of PSE (14%) was used as a farm 
income support. The corresponding CSE was -45%. 
 
The transition period brought a decrease of subsidies. The total support estimate for 2000 
was 1.32% of GDP (comparable to the EU average) (OECD; 2001). In the year 2000, the 
PSE was 18% (compared to 38% in the EU) and the CSE was –11% (compared to –29% in 
the EU) (OECD; 2001). This subsidy drop unmasked the mixed economic performance of 
the agricultural sector. 
 
Table 5:      Total support estimate (TSE) in agricultural sector, as a share of GDP 
(%) 
Country  1986-88  1998  1999  2000 
European Union  2.61  1.46  1.52  1.32 
Czech Republic  12.09  1.69  1.56  1.32 
Poland  2.56  2.29  2.00  1.45 
USA  1.44  1.04  1.04  0.92 
Source: OECD; 2001 
 
This drop in agricultural support came “hand in hand” with the changes of agricultural 
policy objectives. New agricultural policy objectives are intended t o create a market-
oriented, efficient and internationally competitive agricultural sector. Agriculture, in 
principle, is not to be treated as a “special case” different from other sectors of the 
economy. Self-sufficiency in agricultural products is no longer a central policy objective 
and the strong political preference given to agriculture in the past no longer holds. While a 
goal of self-sufficiency is not explicit, stated short-term objectives include adjusting Czech 
agricultural production to domestic demand by the elimination of surpluses, which leaves 
some ambiguity as to the attitude to increased imports of less competitive products. Food 
security is defined as domestic production of basic foodstuffs at a level close to 
consumption, a definition that underlines the ambiguity. The new objectives can be divided 
into short-&-long-term aspects. 
 
The short-run objective was a transformation designed to establish new private enterprises. 
The instruments chosen to achieve this objective included: (a) settlement of property rights 
in land and other agricultural assets, (b) creation of stable market conditions, (c) 
modernisation of agricultural technology, and (d) a better regional distribution of 
production in order to reflect both natural and market conditions. 
 
                                                 
8 Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers. The percentage PSE is the ration of the PSE to 
the value of total gross farm receipts, measured by the total production (at farm gate prices), plus budgetary 
support. The nomenclature and definitions of this indicator replaced the former Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
in 1999 (OECD; 2001, p. 272)   12 
The long-term objectives are focused on: (a) market orientation, (b) efficiency, (c) 
international competitiveness, (d) sustainability and other aspect that contribute to 
improvement of environment (Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic; 2000). 
 
The main instruments for the achievement of agricultural policy objectives are the two 
institutions created in 1992 and 1994, i.e. the State Fund for Market Regulation (SFMR) 
and the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (SGFFF) respectively. The 
essential function of the SFMR is the regulation of domestic market prices through the use 
of intervention purchases and export subsidies. The area payment is the most important 
direct payment. It is given on per hectare bases for agricultural land, and is differentiated 
according to the official price of land. The area payment has declined by 12% since 1999 to 
reach CZK 3.3 billion (€ 92 million) in 2000 (OECD; 2001). Another policy instrument is 
headage payment and this payment was recently substantially reduced. The new headage 
payment, which was introduced in 2000, provides support to extensive livestock breeding 
on permanent pastures. Overall the headage payments were 21% lower than in 1999 
(OECD; 2001). Total expenditures on area and headage payments declined from 1999 to 
2000 by 14% (OECD; 2001).
9  Direct payments to promote organic farming, which were 
introduced in 1998, are constantly increasing and in 2000 were at CZK 89 million (€ 2.5 
million). For partial compensation for the damages to crops resulting from a severe 
drought, the government approved a payment to farms of CZK 200 million (€ 5.6 million) 
(OECD; 2001).   
 
The price-regulating function of the SFMR is complemented by and depends on trade 
policy, mainly in the form of border tariffs. Since 1994, the SGFFF is the main instrument 
for payments used on input side, mainly in the form of credit subsidies.  
 
3.f.  Prices and profits 
 
With the price liberalisation of 1 January 1991, the market volume decreased and prices 
increased non-proportionally in all segments: (i) markets for agricultural inputs, (ii) 
markets for agricultural products, (iii) markets for processed products, and (iv) consumer 
markets. The total  volume of food consumption declined, the largest reduction of 
consumption occurring for butter, milk, dairy products, beef and sugar, which are 
traditional produce of Czech agricultural enterprises. Increases occurred in the consumption 
of fruit and vegetable, esp. in case of tropical fruits (Kraus et al; 1994). These increases in 
demand had no direct benefits to the Czech agricultural enterprises, but to the importers. 
This trend was complemented by a 4% decrease in arable land
10, which is why the market 
for agricultural products has contracted by 30% of the GDP contribution, more in animal 
than crop production (Government Office of the Czech Republic; 2001). This, for the 
primary agriculture unfavourable decrease in consumption, was complemented by rise in 
agro-food imports and stagnated exports (European Commission; 1998). 
 
The most serious impact of the price liberalisation is that the development of producers’ 
prices does not reflect the proportional price-increase of agricultural inputs - the price-cost 
scissor phenomenon. This price-cost squeeze negatively influences the sector’s economic 
output. In this regards, the agricultural market, due to the non-balanced market links, failed. 
This could be explained to a certain extent by the poor fit between the  objectives of 
                                                 
9 Acreage and headage payments are part of the WTO Blue Box. The use of such measures is subject to 
notification to the WTO, which the Czech Republic has not done.  
10 Calculations are based on data presented by Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic (1998).   13 
multinational conglomerates and supermarket chains, the main market players, dictating 
market conditions, and the scattered interests of farmers. 
 
Data series on the economic output (profits/losses) are documented in table 2. These data 
illustrate that profit was in most years negative.
11 The only exception is year 1995, when 
the economic output was slightly positive. Another exception is year 2000, but the reason 
of profitability was an exceptional government support of CZK 5 billions (€ 139 millions) 
to compensate for drought. This is a classical textbook example of economic theory, where 
bad weather does not necessary bring bad economic output. The total accounting losses 
from 1991 to 2000, including losses of CZK 3.7 billions (€ 112 millions) incurred by 
transfers of state farms in 1994, reached CZK 39.6 billions (about € 1.2 billions). It will be 
therefore difficult for the agricultural sector to sustain economic viability, if there are no 
financial resources.  Although official data on the profitability of Czech agricultural sector 
in 2001 are recently not available, Jirovsky, Chairman of the Czech Agricultural 
Association, states that: “the profit will not reach the last year’s CZK 3.7 bln. This will be 
because of the 11% increase of input costs. Other negative factors that negatively affected 
the economic profit were the BSE crises” (in MF Dnes; 2001). 
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15.9  18.7  19.2  28.8  30.6  33.6  34.3  34.0  35.8  36.2  36.9  36.0 
Source: Calculations based on data presented by Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic 
(1992-2001), Press Department of the Ministry of Agriculture (2001) and OECD (1995) 
Note: Data in year 1994 include losses of CZK 3.7 billions incurred by transformation of state 
farms. Data for 1989 and 1990 encompasses only co-operative and state farms. Therefore these 
data do not include economic output of other state-owned enterprises that were active in 
agriculture during that time, or the economic output of private farmers. 
 
Economic loss incurred by the agricultural sector is a response to changes in the macro-
economic environment, mainly price liberalisation, decline in subsidies and credit access 
aggravation. Further reasons were linked to the structural changes such as restraints in non-
agricultural activities, which previously contributed substantially to profits in agricultural 
holdings. The government, either directly or indirectly also influences the economic output 
of the agricultural sector. The not always sustainable intervention policies can distort the 
economic situation of the agricultural sector even further. The low political importance of 
                                                 
11 The calculation of profit is not straightforward. There is a difference between profit calculated during the 
centrally-planned economy and free-market. Furthermore, even in free-market economy, the calculation of 
profit under the system of single and double-entry bookkeeping is not tautological. Although both systems are 
similar, the double-entry bookkeeping is, compare to the single-entry bookkeeping, more detailistic in regard 
to the evidence of costs and revenues, and it is possible to embody costs and revenues of previous and coming 
years (in communication with Jaroslava Chloupkova, Sabris s.r.o., Czech Republic; January 2002).   14 
the agricultural sector, based on its small size and relatively low importance, also works 
against Czech farmers, however not necessary against the Czech economy in general.
12  
 
Doucha (2001) notes that, “only a relatively small number of farms of all types are 
approaching the maximum productivity that can be achieved under the current economic 
conditions, for a large number of farms maximum productivity is a far distant goal”. At the 
beginning of transformation, there were not big differences among different types of 
holdings; more precisely clear ownership relations were among important factors 
influencing economic performance. In respect to the current situation, Doucha (2001) 
claims that the viability of farms as evaluated by their structure of assets and liabilities, 
liquidity, indebtness, etc., differ across the farm structure. About 30% of farms operating as 
legal entities are “ripe” for liquidation, another 40% of these farms are in a “grey zone” 
with the prospect of becoming healthy, and a remaining 30% of these farms have stabilised.  
 
More precisely, Doucha (2001) states that in 1999, the majority (54.2%) of farms operating 
as legal entities showed a loss. In particular 56.9% of co-operative farms made losses, 
while the same indicator for joint-stock companies was 51.3%. In comparison, 53.4% of 
companies operating as Limited Liability structures created profit. Although these 
differences are n ot vast, we can conclude that “legal person” farm structures operating 
under the Limited Liability title are likely to be more successful. This could be explained 
by management accountability; in case of a farm operating as a Limited Liability enterprise 
the responsibility lies with one particular person who is in charge. It would be desirable if a 
direct comparison between farms operating as “legal” and “physical” persons could be 
made, but because both are subject to different type of accounting, this is  not possible. 
Farms operating as “physical person” are typically private farms where the level of 
responsibility (similarly to the one of Limited Liabilities Structures) is probably higher. 
Their economic output in the single-entry bookkeeping is derived as the difference between 
incomes and expenses. Based on the results from the single-entry bookkeeping, farm 








Table 4: Private farms in the Czech Republic (1999) 
Size category (ha)  Indicator 
5-50  51-100  101-300  301 and 
up 
Total 
Number of farms 
 
201  160  141  53  555 
Area farmed (ha) 
 
6,103  11,611  23,299  34,517  75,530 
Average size (ha)  30  73  165  651  136 
                                                 
12 In 2001, the state agricultural budget will amount to approximately € 391 million, which represents 2% of 
the state budget. Support schemes for the agrarian sector amount to € 192 million (European Commission; 
2001). In comparison, the Polish government allocates 12% of its budget to the agricultural sector (European 
Commission; 2001).  
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Number of permanent full-time 
workers 
403  467  531  622  2,023 
Share of permanent family 
workers (%) 
95  78  62  17  58 
Number of ha per permanent 
worker 
 
15  25  44  55  37 
Economic output from 
operations per permanent 
worker (€/month) 
437  526  1,119  78  526 
Based on: Doucha et. al. (2001) 
Note: Economic output at private farms refers to the difference between income and expenses; 
Exchange rate used for 1999 is 1€ = 36.9 CZK 
 
The viability of farms is particularly influenced by their level of debt and the form those 
debts take. More specifically Czech farms are burdened by the following three forms of 
debt (Doucha et. al; 2001): (i) Old (pre-reform) loans, which almost exclusively concern 
those farms operating as legal entities. (ii) “Transformation” debts, differing according to 
the manner in which the farms were established: transformation shares of co-operatives to 
the owners who have decided not to be members of the new transformed co-operative
13. 
Furthermore this category encompasses interest-free loans to restituted farms or 
installments for the privatised non-land assets of privatised farms. It is encouraging to note 
that the transformation of co-operative structures into joint-stock companies improves the 
capital structure of the farms and their economic stability. (iii) New debts, esp. commercial 
loans acquired through the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry. Despite 
the claims presented by Doucha (2001), data and interview with the Support and Guarantee 
Fund for Farmers and Forestry (SGFFF), suggest that the rate of repayment is impressively 
high, reaching 96.5%. This would indicate that the amount of new debts is not the most 
worrying; on the contrary it indicates that it is worthwhile to lend to farmers. 
 
The relatively large debt overhang has been estimated at around CZK 50,000 mil. (€ 1,350 
mil.) (European Commission; 1998). According to the Research Institute of Agricultural 
Economics in Prague, in 1999, owner’s equity in joint-stock companies formed about two-
thirds of all assets, whilst this equity indicator ratio was about 20% for co-operative farms. 
The rate of indebtness (the long-term commitments) in the owner’s equity ratio represents 
81% for co-operative farms, whilst in joint-stock companies only 11.2% (Doucha et. al.; 
2001).  
 
Carrying on debts only aggravated the bad economic situation of agricultural enterprises, 
and therefore the Czech government aims either at explicitly writing off old and 
transformation debts or at creating incentives (i.e. implicitly writing off through tax system) 
to stimulate co-operatives to repay their debts to the eligible shareholders (Gruza; 1999). 
The presence of state loans that the agricultural enterprises were unable to repay further 
deepened their difficult economic situation. In this regard, co-operative farms are more 
likely to suffer by these problems than other farming structures (European Commission; 
1998). 
 
                                                 
13 These transfers were settled by 1999.    16 
Further pressure on the weakening economic performance came with the change of tax 
system. The current tax system is no longer favourable to the agricultural sector (Kraus et 
al; 1994). Romsa (1993) adds that this tax system is based on international standards and is 
levelled out for all sectors of the economy; i.e. no longer special treatment to the 
agricultural sector in the tax system. 
 
4.  Recommendations & conclusions 
 
Agricultural sector in the Czech Republic has undergone fundamental changes in the last 
twelve years. Its basic structure and policies has changed during the transformation process 
in line with EU principles. The European Commission (2001, p.28) has assessed the recent 
state of transition as: “the Czech Republic can be regarded as a functioning market 
economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union in the near term, provided that it keeps up and completes the implementation of 
structural reforms”.  
 
The new agricultural structure seems to be dynamic. Government policy does not seem to 
favour any particular structure and all enterprises are subject to the same Commercial 
Code. Based on the unbiased treatment of agricultural enterprises, all have to operate in a 
competitive environment in which survival is determined by the ability and flexibility of 
management. These new policies seem to be in line with the initiatives of the European 
Union in reforming the Common Agricultural Policy. Furthermore, Czech agriculture has, 
by the EU standards, retained a large-scale structure of operation that, if run efficiently, 
could be an asset. Currently, 7.7% of all registered farms have more than 500 ha and farm 
80% of the agricultural land. On the other hand, 81% of all registered farms are sized under 
50 ha and farm only 6.7% of agricultural land. 
 
However the relatively large debt overhang indicates that the restructuralisation process is 
not yet completed. The typically production oriented co-operatives may be the most 
vulnerable structures in the long-term; after all, this form of farming has not emerged in 
countries with long tradition of market economies, except under very special conditions, for 
example the kibbutzim of Israel (OECD; 1995). Furthermore, there are inherent weaknesses 
in the management of co-operative farms in their pure form; the one-member, one vote 
principle can lead to poor economic decisions. Their survival under competitive m arket 
conditions would require their further transformation into other corporate structures or 
hybrid structures involving a mixture of co-operative management at the top and other 
corporate structures below. Lately, the existence of some co-operative farms seems to be 
justified only from a social point of view, as they seem to function as a “buffer” for rural 
employment, since farm managers “do not have the heart” to release the excess labour. This 
experience is similar to the one of developing countries, where the agricultural sector hides 
the unemployment.  
 
Under the current conditions, it will be inevitable that many co-operative farms go out of 
business, but other farms or managers will take over their capital and land. The remaining 
co-operative farms are likely to experience some internal changes, probably transforming 
into joint-stock companies. Nevertheless, this will likely be a transitional stage on the way 
towards private farming.  
 
Contrary to the co-operative farms whose activities are focused on primary production, co-
operatives operating in the marketing and credit markets’ fields may be beneficial to the   17 
agricultural enterprises. Marketing co-operatives can create the necessary 
monopolistic/oligopolistic power to counterbalance the position o f the usually 
monopoly/oligopoly market players in the up-&-downstream industries; thus the price-cost 
scissor effect can be diminished. 
 
Although private farming saw a great upcoming in the recent decade, the proportion of 
private family farms in the Czech Republic is lower than in EU countries. This can be 
traced to the low level of business grit and willingness of people to change their life-style 
from occupational to entrepreneurial. A further reason can be seen in insufficient 
theoretical understanding and practical preparedness of landowners to undertake 
independent farming businesses. From the practical reasons, it was the lack of financial 
means for the necessary investments that had to be carried out for structural adjustments of 
large-capacity technologies to family farms’ holdings. In a sociological context, the threat 
of unemployment was lacking, i.e. no incentives to undertake private entrepreneurial 
initiatives.  
 
Another reason of the aggravated economic output could be idea of social capital (W). 
Putnam (1993) stresses the correlation between time of dictatorship and its detrimental 
effect on trust and co-operation. According to Paldam & Svendsen (2001), social capital is 
low in the old communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Paldam  & Svendsen 
(2001) further claims that while normal social capital was destroyed under communism, 
some bad social capital was allowed to exist, and that it grew at the latter, soft stages of 
communism. Thus the rebuilding of social capital after the big change in 1989/90 took a 
bad direction, which it had already started to take during the latter stages of communism. 
Data presented by Paldam (2001) show that the CEECs have only about a third to one half 
of the social capital that Denmark has.
14 
 
Despite major drawbacks inherited in the Czech agriculture, the “way ahead” could be the 
use of the already widespread leasing contracts for land and other assets. Renting and 
leasing thus serve as an alternative to land purchases; long-term leases of seven to ten years 
are popular. Despite the low level of land prices, land sales have been negligible. The 
Research Institute of Agricultural Economy in Prague estimated that only 0.1-0.15% of the 
total agricultural area enters the land market annually.  
 
Purchases of land, and any long-term investments are inhibited by the restrained access to 
agricultural credit (Swinnen et. al.; 2001). The current level of credit in the Czech 
agricultural sector is inadequate and the credit market is not working efficiently 
(Chloupkova; 1996). This structural element would have to change in order to make the 
agricultural sector profitable in the long run. The real bottleneck in the profitability issue 
and restructuralisation is the restricted credit access necessary for long-term investment 
purposes; without the necessary investment in the sector, its economic performance will not 
improve. This problem can be alleviated by tapping into existing social structures, as for 
example by relying on joint liability to supplement the traditional collateral can be applied 
in the Czech Republic (Chloupkova & Bjørnskov; 2001). Moreover, employing this social 
capital often creates additional social and economic benefits external to the original 
investment decisions. 
 
                                                 
14 Keynote presentation at the Danish Public Choice meeting on November 30
th, 2001 in Copenhagen.   18 
In conclusion, the Czech agriculture underwent a partially successful restructuralisation. 
The real problem of the Czech agricultural sector is the lack profits, and that is why an even 
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